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Abstract 
Credit constraint not only affects the purchasing power of farmers to procure farm inputs 
and cover operating costs in the short run, but also their capacity to make farm-related 
investments as well as risk behaviour in technology choice and adoption. These, in turn, 
have influence on technical efficiency of the farmers.  Although credit constraint problem 
has been recognized in economics literature, especially in those dealing with developing 
countries, little emphasis has been given to its effect on productive efficiency of farmers. In 
light of this, explicitly considering credit constraint, this paper estimated technical efficiency 
of credit-constrained (CCFH) and unconstrained farm households (CUFH)  by employing a 
stochastic frontier technique on farm household survey data from Southeastern Ethiopia. 
The CCFH had mean technical efficiency score of 12% less than that of the CUFH. Given 
the largest proportion of CCFH in Ethiopian farming population, this gap implies 
considerable potential loss in output due to inefficient production. Improving technical 
efficiency of all farm households in general but more of particularly the CCFH is desirable. 
Additional sources of inefficiency differential between the two groups were also identified, 
and education level of household heads, land fragmentation and loan size significantly 
affected technical efficiencies of both groups. Besides, wealth and experience affected the 
CCFH, and household size affected the CUFH. In general, the results have important 
implications for credit, education and land policies in developing countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Credit is one of the components of financial services considered fundamental in all 
production circuits and networks – material and service products (Dicken, 2007). 
However, theories of production and finance developed along separate paths as if 
production and financial decisions could be precisely separated (Blancard et al., 
2006), with little focus on their interactions. Recently, there has been a growing 
interest in understanding the impact of financial structure on production (e.g., Barry 
and Robinson, 2001). In some technical efficiency studies, production inputs and 
corresponding prices are assumed constant, which means that technical efficiency is 
independent of input use (Alvarez and Arias, 2004; Färe et al., 1990; Lee and 
Chambers, 1986; Farrell, 1957). Among others, this unrealistic assumption 
precludes the effect of technical efficiency on input demands (Alvarez and Arias, 
2004) because it assumes away relative differences among producers in terms of 
resource endowments and possible constraints in acquiring additional inputs, which 
indirectly affect the capacity of producers to attain desired level of technical 
efficiency. In addition, short-term efficiency indices are estimated within a 
framework of a given production technology. This also ignores the fact that the 
capacity of farmers to choose appropriate and more efficient technologies can be 
constrained by bounds of their resources (e.g., Alene and Hassan, 2006), one of 
such bounds being credit constraints. However, it is a common knowledge that 
asymmetric information and incentive compatibility problems lead to capital market 
imperfections, which in turn bring about credit constraints faced by borrowers 
(Blancard et al., 2006; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Given underdeveloped 
infrastructure, inadequate institutional environment, and less competitive market 
situation in developing countries, credit market imperfections are common 
phenomena.  Of course, credit constraint is not only a problem of developing 
countries. As evidence from various studies (Blancard et al., 2006; Gloy et al., 
2005; Jappelli, 1990; Tauer and Kaiser, 1988; Lee and Chambers, 1986) shows, 
farmers in developed countries, especially small farmers, also face credit 
constraints, since developed countries’ credit markets are yet not as perfect as often 
assumed in standard economic theories. For example, Blancard et al.(2006) 
observed that 67% of the farmers in their sample of 178 French farmers were 
financially constrained in the short run. In light of this, the presence of credit 
constraints is less debatable than its extent in the literature (e.g., Pal, 2002; Bali 
Swain, 2002; Kochar, 1997). This is mainly because access to credit market may 
not be translated automatically into one’s participation in the credit market, given 
considerable information asymmetry and incentive compatibility problems (Diagne 
and Zeller, 2001; Barry and Robinson, 2001), and taking loans may not also lead to 
automatic solution to credit constraints (Guirkinger and Boucher, 2005; Freeman et 
al., 1998). For example, Barry & Robinson (2001) argue that access to external 
financing resources being limited, farmers’ operations and investments heavily 
depend on internal financing. Farmers in developing countries are internally also 
constrained due to meagre resources they command. 
 
As much as credit is fundamental to the operation of all production circuits and 
networks (Dicken, 2007), on the contrary, credit constraint can have direct and 
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indirect effects on, for example, farm production. Directly, it can affect the 
purchasing power of producers to procure farm inputs and finance operating 
expenses in the short run and to make farm-related investments in the long run; and 
indirectly, it can affect risk behaviour of producers (Guirkinger and Boucher, 2005; 
Eswaran and Kotwal, 1990), thereby affecting technology choice and adoption by 
farmers. In this connection, for example, Binswanger & Deininger (1997) argue 
that an unequal distribution of initial endowments in environments where financial 
markets are imperfect and credit is rationed can prevent a large proportion of the 
population from making productive investments. Thus, a credit-constrained farmer 
is more likely to invest in less risky and less productive rather than in more risky 
and more productive technologies (Dercon, 1996). This risk behaviour affects 
technical efficiency of the farmers, thereby limiting the effort of the farmer in 
attaining maximum possible output. The notion that a credit constraint influences 
agricultural production has long been observed in the literature (e.g., Blancard et 
al., 2006; Petrick, 2005; Barry and Robinson, 2001; Färe et al., 1990; Lee and 
Chambers, 1986); however, empirical studies of its influence on efficiency are 
generally limited, scarce in most developing countries and particularly lacking in 
Ethiopia. In particular, most previous efficiency studies in Ethiopia (Haji, 2007; 
Haji and Andersson, 2006; Alene and Hassan, 2006; Gavian and Ehui, 1999; 
Admassie, 1999; Hailu et al., 1998) used a dummy variable for access to credit, 
measuring whether or not farmers took credit in producing outputs. This implicitly 
assumes that farmers who obtained loans would have their effective credit demand 
satisfied and would become credit-unconstrained. Obviously, this will not 
disentangle the difference between borrowing status and credit constraint condition 
(Diagne and Zeller, 2001; Freeman et al., 1998). Using a dummy variable in this 
way can only allow capturing whether or not the farmer had access to a credit 
facility or had obtained the credit. It does not show whether access to credit 
satisfies effective credit demand and alleviates credit constraints of the farmers or 
not. For example, Freeman et al. (1998) noted absence of relationship between 
farmers’ borrowing and credit constraint status in Ethiopia, and suggested that 
significant proportion of those with some amount but inadequate loans still faced 
credit constraint in their economic activities. This also suggests that one needs to 
look into credit transactions and learn more from the borrowers in order to assess 
their credit constraint status (Boucher et al., 2005; Iqbal, 1986), and this paper used 
this approach. 
 
In light of the preceding arguments, this study estimated technical efficiency of 
credit constrained (CCFH) and unconstrained farm households (CUFH) by 
disaggregating the full sample on the basis of credit-constraint status of the farm 
households, and identified factors additionally affecting their technical efficiencies. 
Results indicate that the CCFH had mean technical efficiency score of 12% less 
than that of the CUFH. Given the largest proportion of CCFH in Ethiopian farming 
population, the gap is a considerable potential loss in output due to technical 
inefficiency, which the country cannot afford to ignore because of the food deficit 
problem it has currently faced. The result suggests that improving technical 
efficiency of all farm households in general and more of the CCFH in particular is 
desirable. Beyond the country in focus, i.e., Ethiopia, the results have important 
implications for credit, education, and land policies in developing countries, where 
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credit constraints are also widely observed.  The rest of the paper is constructed as 
follows. Related theoretical and empirical literature is briefly reviewed in the next 
section. In section 3, the theoretical framework of technical efficiency is presented, 
followed by the empirical model in section 4. Describing the data in section 5, 
results and discussion are presented in section 6. Finally, conclusions and policy 
implications are suggested. 
 
2.  Credit constraint, access to credit market, and 
efficiency effect: review of literature 
Credit market literature distinguishes between access to credit and participation in 
credit markets (e.g., Diagne and Zeller, 2001). A farm household has access to 
credit from a particular source if it is able to borrow from that source, whereas it 
participates in the credit market if it actually borrows from that source of credit. 
This implies that access to credit can be a constraint externally imposed on the farm 
households, while participation in a credit market is a choice made by a farm 
household. Thus, a household can have access but may choose not to participate in 
the credit market for such reasons as expected rate of return of the loan and/or risk 
consideration. In this connection, Eswaran & Kotwal (1990) argue that a non-
participating household that has access to credit will still benefit if the knowledge 
of access increases its ability to bear risk, as it can be encouraged to experiment 
with riskier, but potentially high-yielding technology. The ability to borrow will 
also alleviate the need for accumulation of assets that mainly serve as precautionary 
savings, yielding poor or negative returns (Deaton, 1991). 
 
Duca & Rosenthal (1993) argue that a farm household is credit constrained only 
when it would like to borrow more than lenders allow or if its preferred demand for 
credit exceeds the amount lenders are willing to supply. Stiglitz & Weiss (1992), on 
the other hand, describe credit constraints in two terms -- redlining and credit 
rationing. Redlining refers to excluding certain observationally distinct groups from 
credit markets, rather than offering them a contract that require higher interest 
payments and collateral guarantee. Credit rationing refers to a situation in which, 
among observationally identical borrowers, some get loans and others are denied. 
 
Zeller et al. (1997) distinguish four groups of farm households in relation to 
credit constraints. The first, referred to as voluntary non-borrowers, are those who 
decline to borrow at will either because they have strong risk aversion and fear of 
getting into debt or because they are prudent and only would like to consume up to 
what they earn. Others who want to borrow less than their combined available 
credit lines from all lenders referred to as non-rationed borrowers. Rationed 
borrowers are those who want to borrow more than their available credit limit at a 
particular point in time. The last type of farm households, referred to as involuntary 
non-borrowers, are non-borrowers with no access to credit, or those who perceive 
that they are highly unlikely to get credit, so that the perceived borrowing costs 
outweigh the expected benefits of the loan. 
 
On the supply side, quantity, transaction costs and risks are identified as relevant 
factors in the existing credit market literature (e.g., Feder, 1985; Foltz, 2004). First, 
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farm households are credit-constrained if they face a binding supply constraint as 
limited by lenders’ considerations. Second, as lenders may pass on transaction costs 
associated with screening, monitoring, and enforcing loan contracts to borrowers, 
as in the case of group lending scheme (Besley and Coate, 1995), farmers with 
investments profitable when evaluated at the contractual interest rate may not be 
profitable when transaction costs are factored in. Thus, they may decide not to 
borrow but remain credit-constrained. Finally, for households with access to credit, 
risk may reduce loan demand and hence productivity. For example, Boucher et al. 
(2005) analytically show that in the presence of moral hazard lenders require 
borrowers to bear some contractual risk, and if this risk is sufficiently large, farmers 
will prefer not to borrow even though the loan would raise their productivity and 
expected income. Lenders assess creditworthiness of their clients based on 
observable characteristics (Bigsten et al., 2003), and extend loans at certain interest 
rate. This means that borrowers are credit-constrained if, at specific interest rate, 
they would have liked to borrow larger amount than the lender supplied. In this 
case, the borrower exhausts this supply and then looks for another lender. However, 
the fact that this borrower exhausts its supply from one source, at specific interest 
rate, makes it a risky borrower for another lender. 
 
Credit markets in developing countries are inefficient due to market 
imperfections such as interest rate ceilings imposed by governments, monopoly 
power often exercised by informal lenders (Bell et al., 1997), large transaction costs 
incurred by borrowers in loan acquisition, and moral hazard problems (Carter, 
1988; Carter and Weibe, 1990). Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) argue that the problem 
where the lender bears risk of the transaction and the borrower obtains project 
benefits can be seen as an information problem. The asymmetries of information in 
credit market imply that first-best credit allocation is not possible, and this leads to 
the need for partial or full collateral. Then, inadequate collateral or lack of it 
implies that some individuals are denied credit, being otherwise identical to those 
who have the collateral and obtain the credits. In this connection, Banerjee (2001) 
argues that high-income individuals can borrow large amounts at low costs whereas 
low-income ones are able to borrow a small amount at high cost. This suggests that 
income or wealth level of borrowers has a direct relationship with the amount of 
available credit and an inverse relationship with cost of credit. 
 
Moreover, lenders may not be allowed legally to charge above certain limits on 
loans, although informal lenders in practice may do so, as, for example, Emana et 
al. (2005) noted in Ethiopia. If the lender is not allowed to charge an interest rate at 
which the expected return is positive, then there will be credit rationing. Even if 
allowed to do so, lenders may be affected by adverse selection and/or incentive 
problems so that the expected return on a loan may not monotonically increase with 
interest rate. That is, lenders may try to avoid selection and incentive problems by 
rationing credit. 
 
In general, the theoretical literature above shows that credit market failures give 
rise to heterogeneous resource allocation and different outcomes among farm 
households with varying characteristics. That is, a farm household that faces a 
binding credit constraint, ceteris paribus, will misallocate its resources and under-
invest compared to its unconstrained peer. Availability of finance and its 
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accessibility crucially affect production start-up and subsequent performances of 
the farmers. Barriers to access adequate loans will have adverse effect on technical 
efficiency of the farm households. Increased output production following improved 
access to credit is therefore evidence of binding credit constraint. 
 
Most empirical literature reviewed below also support that credit constraints 
could affect resource allocations, risk behaviour and technology choice and 
adoption in production, which may lead to lower output of CCFH compared to the 
CUFH. For example, better access to credit resulted in higher income and 
consumption in Bangladesh (Diagne and Zeller, 2001) and in higher farm 
profitability in Cote d’Voire (Adesina and Djato, 1996), Malawi (Hazarika and 
Alwang, 2003) and in Tunisia (Foltz, 2004). Examining sources of efficiency 
differentials among basmati rice producers in the Punjab province of Pakistan, Ali 
& Flinn (1989) found significant effect of farmers’ access to credit and later Parikh 
et al. (1995) also found that farmers with greater loan uptake were less cost 
inefficient than those with smaller loan size. Another study in Pakistan by Khandker 
& Faruqee (2003) reported formal credit’s positive impact on household welfare 
outcomes. It was also found that formal credit increased rural income and 
productivity and that overall benefits exceeded costs of the formal credit system by 
about 13 percent in India (Binswanger and Khandker, 1995). Significant difference 
in productivities of credit-constrained and unconstrained households was observed 
in China (Feder et al., 1990; Feder et al., 1989). In Bangladesh, Pitt & Khandker 
(1996) examined the impact of credit from the Grameen Bank and other two 
targeted credit programs and found significant effects on household welfare, 
including education, labour supply and asset holding. Freeman et al. (1998) found 
that the marginal contribution of credit to milk productivity was different among 
credit-constrained and non-constrained farmers in east Africa. 
 
More recently, studying the effect of credit constraints in Peruvian agriculture, 
Guirkinger & Boucher (2005) found that productivity of credit-constrained 
households depended on their endowments of productive assets and the credit they 
obtained from informal lenders. In Ethiopia, for example, Alene and Hassan (2006), 
studying the efficiency of traditional and hybrid maize production in eastern 
Ethiopia, found significant difference in farmers’ technical efficiency due to 
differences in technology choice. The hybrid maize technology required adoption 
of a package of improved seed, chemical fertilizers, and cultural practices that 
farmers did not equally adopt, resulting in low technical efficiency differential. Part 
of the reason for the farmers’ differential adoption of modern technology could be 
the credit constraints they face. Similarly, Holden & Bekele (2004) observed that 
households with access to credit compensated for increasing risk of drought by 
reallocating their production in such a way that crop sales were lower in good years 
to reduce the need to buy the crops in bad years. They argued that the households 
would be less able to do so without access to credit. Other efficiency studies in 
Ethiopia referred to earlier also identify access to credit as an important factor 
affecting efficiency of farmers. 
 
It can also be seen that credit constraint is not only a problem of developing 
countries, where credit market imperfection is the norm rather than exception. The 
problem is present also in the developed world, where credit market imperfection is 
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considered significantly lower (Blancard et al., 2006; Jappelli, 1990; Färe et al., 
1990; Tauer and Kaiser, 1988; e.g., Lee and Chambers, 1986). For example, 
Blancard et al. (2006), studying short- and long-run credit constraints in French 
agriculture (where 67% of 178 sample farms were financially constrained in the 
short-run and nearly all farms face investment constraints in the long run) found 
that financially unconstrained farms are larger in size and better in economic 
performance than financially constrained small farmers, resulting in a difference of 
about 8.34% in profit. However, the nature and extent of credit constraints in 
developed countries are significantly different from those in developing countries, 
where the imperfection is also prevalent in other factor markets. 
 
In general, although credit is mostly identified as one of the socioeconomic 
factors affecting different outcomes such as farm productivity and profitability, 
household welfare, and so on, only few studies have directly focused on the effects 
of credit constraints on technical efficiencies. The recent paper by Blancard et al. 
(2006) is directly related to ours but since it focuses on developed economy, it 
cannot represent developing countries’ conditions. The generally limited studies 
explicitly addressing the effect of credit constraints on technical efficiency suggest 
that more studies are still desirable. 
 
3. Theoretical framework 
In economic theory, it is often assumed that producers maximize revenue, minimize 
cost or maximize profit. However, not all producers are equally efficient in this 
process. Given the same inputs and technology, some produce more outputs, more 
efficiently than others do. In the literature, there are different methods of estimating 
efficiency. At a broader level, one can find parametric, semiparametric and 
nonparametric methods, based on whether or not one can assume a functional form 
for an underlying technology and a specific distribution for the error terms. In the 
parametric family, one can also find deterministic and stochastic efficiency 
measures depending on whether or not random terms are accounted for. The 
stochastic estimation techniques attribute observed deviations from the efficient 
frontier to inefficiency and random errors, while in deterministic models, the 
deviations are attributed solely to inefficiencies, despite that random errors are 
present. 
 
Moreover, productive efficiency literature (Farrell, 1957; Aigner et al., 1977; 
Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro, 1993; Sharma et al., 1999; Wadud, 2003) distinguishes 
between technical, allocative and economic efficiencies. In this paper, we focus on 
technical efficiency, explicitly taking into account the credit-constraint status of the 
farm households affecting input use as given. Technical efficiency is defined as the 
ability to avoid waste by producing as much output as input usage allows, or by 
using as little input as output production allows (Farrell, 1957). 
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This study makes use of stochastic frontier analysis (SFA)
†
, which requires a 
parametric representation of the production technology and incorporates stochastic 
output variability by means of a composite (two-part) error term. In particular, we 
estimate technical efficiencies of the sample farm households, given their difference 
in credit constraint status. Based on stochastic efficiency method, a general 
stochastic frontier model is defined as: 
 
)n,,,i();uvexp();(fy iiii 21 βx          (1) 
 
where iy  represents the output of the ith farm household, n being the sample size, 
iX a vector of variable inputs,   is a vector of technology parameters, );( ii Xf  
is the production frontier. The symmetric random error iv accounts for random 
variations in output, which is assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed as ),0( 2vN   independent of the iu s; the iu s are non-negative random 
variables, associated with technical inefficiency in production, which are assumed 
to be independently and identically distributed and truncations at zero of the normal 
distribution with mean,  , and variance, 2u , (i.e., | |),(
2
uN  ). The variance 
parameters of the model are parameterized as 222 uv   ; 
22 / u  and 
.10    Given the distributional assumptions of iv and iu , the estimate of 
iu can be derived from its conditional expectation, given the composite error 
)( iii uv  , applying the standard integrals (Jondrow et al., 1982). 

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
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
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
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)|u(E
*
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*
ii*
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

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         (2) 
where )()( 2222* uvuivi    , )(
22222*
uvuvi    and (.) and 
(.) represent cumulative distribution and probability density functions, 
respectively. Therefore (1) provides estimates for iv and iu after replacing i ,   
and   by their estimates. That is, the output-oriented technical efficiency of the ith 
farm household iTE , given the levels of inputs, is defined as the ratio of observed 
                                                          
†
Empirical efficiency studies usually utilize either Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) or SFA. DEA is a nonparametric approach employing linear programming 
to construct a piecewise-linear, best-practice frontier for each economic unit (Färe, 
R., Grosskopf, S. and Logan, J. (1985) The relative importance of publicly owned 
and privately owned electric utilities. Journal of Public Economics 26: 89-106.). 
Although, it does not impose a functional form on the data, it attributes all off-
frontier deviations to inefficiency by assuming away the possibility of noisy data. 
SFA explicitly accounts for random shocks and is thus more appropriate in an 
environment such as our study area, where data can be noisy.  
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output to maximum feasible output in a state of nature depicted by 
)vexp( i (Battese et al., 1996) as follows. 
)}|u(exp{
)vexp();(f
y
TE ii
ii
i
i 
βx
        (3) 
The distribution of iu  limits the estimated technical efficiency of a farm household 
i between 0 and 1. The inefficiency scores iIE  of credit-constrained and 
unconstrained farm households are defined as )}|uexp{( ii 1 and are used 
as dependent variables in the estimated inefficiency effects models.  
 
4. Empirical model 
4.1 Econometric model specification 
To assess farm household-specific technical efficiencies using parametric approach, 
the log-linear Cobb-Douglas stochastic production frontier
‡
 is specified as  



6
1
0
k
iiikiki uvxlnYln             (4) 
where iy is the aggregated value of farm outputs of the i
th
 farm household in the 
sample, measured in Ethiopian Birr
§
 and ikx are the input variables, i.e., land, 
human labour, fertilizer, seed, herbicides and pesticides; the  s are parameters to 
be estimated; and iv  and iu are as defined earlier in equation (1). To compare 
technical efficiencies of credit-constrained and unconstrained farm households, 
equation (4) is estimated using maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) separately for 
the two sub-samples, identified by a variable indicating their credit constraint 
status. 
 
To investigate the effect of farm households’ demographic, socioeconomic and 
institutional factors on technical efficiency, the inefficiency effects model in 
equation (5) is separately estimated for the two groups of farm households using 
least squares method. 
 
iiiIE   Z                      (5) 
where iIE  is inefficiency scores defined earlier; iZ is a vector of proposed 
household demographic, socioeconomic and institutional variables affecting 
efficiency; and i  is a random error term, assumed to be normally and 
independently distributed with mean zero and variance, 2 . 
 
                                                          
‡
 The log-linear Cobb-Douglas specification was preferred to other alternatives 
such as the translog due to its convenience to interpret the estimates readily.  
§
 The exchange rate was at 8.80 Birr =1US$ in January 2007.  
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4.2 Model variables and hypotheses 
4.2.1 Dependent variable 
It was hypothesized that the CCFHs would be more efficient than CUFHs. To test 
this, data collected from farm households were classified as credit-constrained and 
credit-unconstrained as reported by the sample farm household heads. Farm outputs 
were measured as annual farm revenues, by also accounting for the values of unsold 
and home-consumed outputs. Assuming same average output price in a season at 
which the farm households could sell their outputs, the revenues allowed 
aggregation of multiple outputs (Parikh et al., 1995), which otherwise was difficult 
to aggregate. Farm revenue per hectare was used as dependent variable in the 
estimation of the stochastic frontier production function, as used by other 
researchers (e.g., Alene and Hassan, 2006; Wadud and White, 2000; Feder et al., 
1990). Assuming that production technologies are homogeneous within the sample 
and output prices are the same in a season, the difference in per-hectare revenue is 
believed to capture technical efficiency differential among credit-constrained and 
unconstrained farm households. In the inefficiency effects models of equation (5), 
the dependent variable is the inefficiency score defined earlier.   
 
4.2.2 Independent variables and hypotheses 
The independent variables for both the stochastic frontier production function and 
the inefficiency effects models are explained and their effects hypothesized as 
follows.  
 
Production inputs  
Land, labour, seed, fertilizer, herbicide and pesticide are inputs in the stochastic 
frontier production function specified in equation (4). The inputs are expected to 
have positive effect on the value of outputs in the production function. However, 
suboptimal use of some inputs may result in negative output effect and inefficient 
production. Land (LAND) is the total land area operated by the household, 
including that owned, rented in, contracted in and obtained through gift, and 
measured in hectare (ha). Labour (LABOR) is family labour force and external 
labour supply (hired, exchanged, or gift), measured in man-days. Fertilizer (FERT) 
is the quantity of chemical fertilizers called UREA and DAP applied to the crop, 
measured in kilograms (Kg).  Seed (SEED) is the measure of improved and local 
seed varieties used by farm households, measured in Kg. Pesticides (PEST) and 
herbicides (HERB) are measures of the quantities of pesticides and herbicides, 
respectively, used by the sample farm households, both measured in millilitres (ml).  
The quantities and qualities of the inputs and the technical skills of the farm 
households to use the inputs properly determine technical efficiency of the farm 
households. 
 
Land is an important input to agricultural production affecting farm output 
(Wadud, 2003), but the effect of farm size on efficiency is mixed. Some studies 
suggest that small farms are more efficient than large ones, but others oppose to 
this, justifying based on economies of scale and scope associated with larger sizes. 
 10  
 
 
 
However, undoubtedly, one can see that use of external inputs increases with farm 
size, and economies of size may be attained as farm size increases. Moreover, 
larger farms may positively affect lenders’ valuation of borrowers’ creditworthiness 
(Khandker and Faruqee, 2003), as do farm outputs and income. Farm households 
with large farms would allocate resources more efficiently because they would have 
better access to credit and would better finance farm operations and on-farm 
investments. 
 
Agricultural production in developing countries is a highly labour-intensive 
economic activity. In addition to its direct effect, farm labour supply may also have 
indirect effect on efficiency since it is complementary to other farm inputs. 
However, all farm households are not equally endowed with family labour. A farm 
household with inadequate family labour may wish to satisfy its farm labour 
demand externally, and to pay for this, will demand credit. Therefore, if the farm 
household is constrained in the credit market, it may also be constrained in the 
labour market. 
 
The other variable inputs are often not family supplied, except SEED where 
farmers may use from their saved harvests; they are rather purchased from the 
market. Credit constraint will have direct effect on their use (Demeke et al., 1998) 
and their suboptimal use in turn will affect the use of land and labour inputs, and 
thus production efficiency. Farmers who are unconstrained in the credit market are 
more likely to choose optimal levels of these inputs than their credit-constrained 
counterparts are. 
 
Inefficiency factors  
After technical efficiencies are estimated for the two groups of farm households, 
sources of inefficiency differentials among farm households, besides credit 
constraint, are estimated using inefficiency scores as a dependent variable. As 
referred to earlier, the efficiency studies in Ethiopia and elsewhere (e.g., Coelli and 
Battese, 1996) show that several household demographic, socio-economic and 
institutional factors affect efficiency differentials among farmers. However, the 
effect of these factors varies in time and space, depending on specific situations in 
the study countries, making it imperative to test their effects also in this study area. 
 
Demographic factors 
Traditional farming has evolved over years through farmers’ own experience of 
continuous experimentation and learning. Farmers develop and accumulate 
experiences including farm financing over time, and learn about farm technologies 
and subsequent productivity effects, market behaviours, and general physical and 
economic environments to make choices. Farmers may enhance their productive 
efficiencies, as they get more experienced, learn how to increase income-generating 
capacities and become able to use cost-effective strategies to cope with adverse 
shocks. For example, experience in borrowing may help farmers to use external 
sources effectively to smooth output and income fluctuations. Controlling for this, 
the age of the farm household head (AGEH) is hypothesized to increase productive 
efficiency. Previous studies also indicate positive effect of experience on farmer 
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efficiency (Kalirajan and Shand, 1985; Stefanou and Saxena, 1988; Battese and 
Coelli, 1995; Battese et al., 1996). 
 
Education is also expected to increase labour productivity by influencing 
managerial skills of farm operators, as skilled farmers are more likely to allocate 
resources more efficiently. Hence, education level (EDUCL) as measured in farm 
household head’s years of schooling is included with a positive effect. 
Nevertheless, results from previous empirical studies are mixed. For example, while 
Bravo-Ureta & Pinheiro (1993), Ali & Flinn (1989), Parikh et al. (1995) and 
Battese et al. (1996) show that education has a positive effect on farmer’s 
efficiency, others such as Kalirajan & Shand (1985) and Adesina and Djato  (1996) 
found no significant effect. 
 
Another factor possibly affecting technical efficiency of farm households is 
household size (HHSZ). Family labour is often an important source of labour supply 
in farm households in developing countries. In a situation where rural labour market 
is underdeveloped, which is also the case in the study area, coupled with credit 
constraint, farm households with inadequate family labour will experience farm 
labour deficit, others may experience idle labour surplus. Household size is 
expected to have a positive effect. 
 
Socioeconomic factors 
Here, household wealth and land fragmentation are included. Household wealth 
(WEALTH) captures the market value of total household physical properties such as 
farm implements, machineries and other stocks. Household wealth is expected to 
ease credit constraint in two ways. On the one hand, wealthier farmers are expected 
to own more assets, and will thus have more potential for equity financing, which in 
turn will generate more income. On the other hand, if equity finance falls short of 
total financial requirement, since wealthier farmers own more farm assets, this will 
increase their probability of obtaining external finance through its positive 
influence on lenders’ valuation of creditworthiness. Thus, wealth is expected to 
have a positive effect on efficiency of particularly credit-constrained group, who 
often have smaller wealth. 
 
Fragmentation of landholdings (LANDFRAG) is commonly regarded as a major 
obstacle to growth in agricultural production in developing countries (Tan et al., 
2006). The more the number of plots per total operational holding of a farm 
household and the smaller the plot size, the higher the degree of land fragmentation 
and the less likely is the opportunity to apply new technologies (especially 
indivisible ones) such as irrigation facilities. Therefore, a negative effect is 
expected. 
 
Institutional factors  
Institutional factors are important determinants of productive efficiency (Fulginiti et 
al., 2004). One such factor is access to extension service (EXACSS). In this service, 
farm households often obtain information on improved crop varieties and breeds of 
animals. However, individual variations among farm households in accessing, 
searching and utilizing extension services are expected. As technology adoption 
depends on this service, those with access are expected to be more efficient. Based 
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on results from previous studies (Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro, 1993; Bindlish and 
Evenson, 1993; Parikh et al., 1995) a positive effect is hypothesized. 
 
Efficiency may also be affected by farm households’ access to credit information. 
A farm household cannot apply for loan without having information. Those with 
access to credit information (CREDINFO) will be in a better position to decide 
optimally on external financing and become more efficient than others, hence a 
positive effect is expected. A farm household may be quantity (loan size) rationed 
as the amount of credit obtained becomes inadequate for optimal choice of other 
variable factors of production, for desirable economies of scale require 
proportionate change in all factors of production. To see this, loan size (CREDSZ) 
is controlled for and a positive effect is hypothesized. Interest rate is a cost of 
capital to borrower farm households, and depending on choice of lenders, they may 
incur higher costs inefficiently. In this connection, for example, Gloy et al. (2005), 
studying the costs and returns of agricultural credit delivery in U.S., concluded that 
many large borrowers have access to credit rates that are more favourable. 
Therefore, we expect interest rate (INTEREST) to have negative effect on 
production efficiency. In Ethiopia, in general, and in the study areas, in particular, 
since communication and transportation infrastructure are less developed, access to 
available credit may be affected by physical proximity of the borrower to the 
location of the lender. To control for temporal and monetary costs of transportation, 
which are transaction costs to an individual borrower, distance to a credit facility 
(DISCREDF) is controlled for with expected negative effect.  
 
5. Data 
Ethiopia is one of the low-income developing countries where farmers and rural 
entrepreneurs operate under very poor infrastructure, with considerable adverse 
effect on their access to formal and semiformal lenders. Moreover, according to the 
existing land property rights law, farmers do not own land and this does not allow 
them to use land as collateral to obtain formal credit. This, among others, 
contributed to the rural credit market failure. The property rights problem, coupled 
with low level of the necessary infrastructure, entailed other forms of credit supply 
mechanism, such as third party guarantee scheme
**
, joint liability of co-borrowers 
often used by microfinance institutions and inventory-based credit supply
††
. 
However, it is yet too early to observe the effect of these mechanisms in meeting 
the credit constraints of farmers, as they only have been implemented for a few 
years. 
 
The data used in this paper were obtained in a farm household survey conducted 
during September 2004 to January 2005 in Merti and Adamitullu-Jido-Kombolcha 
(AJK) districts of Oromia region, Ethiopia. These study areas are located at about 
                                                          
** Regional states offer third-party guarantee to commercial banks against possible defaults, 
enforcing repayment through local administrative machinery. 
†† This is a credit delivery mechanism in which farmers, who face temporary liquidity 
problem at times of low output prices, can borrow against a deposit of farm outputs at a 
common storage facility until higher output prices can be received for products. 
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200 km and 160 km, respectively, to the southeast of the capital, Addis Ababa 
(Finfinne). The farm households were selected randomly from six Farmers 
Associations (FAs) in the two districts – four from Merti and two from AJK. Using 
FA-level list of farm households as a sampling frame, 240 sample farm households 
were randomly selected. Survey enumerators administered the questionnaire to 
heads of sample households by visiting them at their farmsteads. As shown in Table 
I, large fractions of the sample farm households grow several crops such as maize 
(61%), onion (38%), barley (36%), wheat (31%), teff
‡‡
 (30%), haricot beans (25%), 
sorghum (19%), and faba beans (15%) while relatively smaller proportions also 
grow other crops such as rapeseed, tomatoes and green beans. The farm households 
grow multiple crops to diversify their outputs in light of minimizing risks in yields 
and prices. This risk behaviour of farmers is partly a reflection of the extent of the 
credit constraints they face. By diversifying their products, they limit their choice of 
best product mix in order to minimize the occurrence of risk involved, sacrificing 
the benefit of using high-yielding technologies. 
  
Table I: Proportion of farm households growing different crops 
 
Crop 
Grower 
farmers (%)a Crop 
Grower 
farmers (%)a 
Maize 61 Sorghum 19 
Onion 38 Faba beans 15 
Barley 36 Rapeseed 9 
Wheat 31 Tomatoes 8 
Teff 30 Peas 8 
Haricot beans 25 Green beans 3 
 
a 
Percentages are sample proportions of farmers growing a particular crop and do 
not add up to 100%, as most farmers diversify by producing multiple crops. Source: 
Own survey, 2004/05 
 
 
In addition to the usual demographic and socioeconomic variables, farm 
household heads were interviewed on whether or not they had information about 
lenders, whether or not they applied for credit from any external source in the last 
12 months prior to the survey, whether or not their applications were accepted, and 
if so, the amount they obtained and whether or not they were constrained after 
receiving credit. Moreover, information on location of the lender, interest rates 
charged, type of credit obtained and repayments were collected. 
 
Based on descriptive results shown in Table II, the characteristics of credit-
constrained (CCFH) and credit-unconstrained farm households (CUFH) are 
discussed. The overwhelming majority of the sample farm households (70%) 
reported being credit-constrained, which is not surprising, given the low level of 
rural credit market development in Ethiopia in general, and particularly in the study 
areas. Although there is no statistically significant difference between CCFH and 
                                                          
‡‡ Teff (Eragrostis tef ) is an annual cereal crop of grass family often used  in production of 
injera, a major staple food in Ethiopia. 
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CUFH in terms of average age, household size and level of education, the two 
groups have significant differences in other characteristics, as the mean difference 
test statistics
§§
 reported in the last column of Table II show. The CCFHs operate 
more fragmented farmlands than the CUFHs, as measured in the number of plots. 
The proportion of CCFH that applied for credit (65%) is significantly smaller than 
that of the CUFH (71%). Since there is no significant difference in terms of access 
to credit information between the two groups, this suggests that some CCFH did not 
apply for credit for reasons other than lack of credit information. This can possibly 
be due to farm households’ fear of being rejected or consideration of transaction 
costs in application decisions. However, the absence of significant difference 
between the two groups’ access to credit information does not imply that they both 
had adequate information. About 53% and 60%, respectively, of CCFH and CUFH 
had obtained loans and the difference is statistically significant (Table II). 
However, the statistical evidence of quantity rationing is not strong enough, as the 
difference in credit size between the two groups of farm households was 
statistically different from zero at only unconventional 11% level of significance. 
The fact that a considerable number of borrowers remained credit-constrained still 
makes the difference in credit size rationing between the two groups economically 
important to consider. 
 
In terms of production inputs, there were significant differences between the two 
groups of farm households. The CCFH operated more land and used more labour 
but applied lower levels of seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides than the 
CUFH. Although land in Ethiopia is allocated to the farm households based on 
household size, the presence of informal land markets (Pender and Fafchamps, 
2005) may cause difference in operational farm sizes among farm households with 
the same household size. In light of this, more land operated by the CCFHs are 
more likely due to larger household size, which is also the source of household 
labour supply. The variable inputs require more capital to purchase and it was 
observed that the CCFH applied them in lower levels than the CUFH. As a result, 
on the output side, the CCFH obtained less revenue per hectare of land than the 
CUFH. This pattern is similar to the finding by Feder et al. (1989), in which CCFH 
was observed to have used lower levels of inputs and obtained lower outputs than 
unconstrained farmers in China. Moreover, the CCFH had less wealth than the 
CUFH. This result also conforms with Banerjee’s (2001) theoretical claim, where it 
is argued that wealthier farm households get more access to credit because they can 
afford fixed transaction costs, bear more risk and are less risky to lenders than less 
wealthy farm households. 
 
Nevertheless, since these summary statistics are unconditional means, much more 
can be learned by conditioning the average figures on relevant demographic, 
socioeconomic and institutional characteristics of the farm households, which is the 
focus of the econometric estimation in the next section. 
                                                          
§§
 Independent t-test was used to test the null hypothesis of no difference between 
the means of the two groups, where the reported t-ratios were derived as 
)cxux(SE/)cxux(t  , and ux  and cx  are sample means of the variables 
for credit-unconstrained and constrained groups, respectively. 
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Table II: Sample descriptive statistics by credit constraint status 
 
 
Variable 
name 
Variable definition and 
measurement unit 
 
Unconstrained Constrained Full sample 
Mean 
difference 
test 
Mean§ Mean§ Mean§ t-ratio 
AGEH Age of household head 
(years)  
42.23 
(14.95) 
43.69 
(13.76) 
43.25 
(14.12) 
-.734 
HHSZ Household size 
 (No. of members) 
7.58 
(3.01) 
8.02 
(3.97) 
7.89 
(3.70) 
-.863 
EDUCL Household head’s 
education (years) 
4.04 
(4.13) 
3.13 
(3.44) 
3.41 
(3.68) 
-.717 
LANDWN  Total land owned 
(ha) 
1.62 
(1.17) 
1.89 
(1.34) 
1.81 
(1.29) 
-9.615*** 
SEED Crop seed used 
 (kg) 
141.10 
(192.78) 
137.63 
(138.51) 
138.68 
(156.60) 
-9.070*** 
FERT Chemical fertilizer used 
(kg) 
165.58 
(259.40) 
129.42 
(217.19) 
140.42 
(230.90) 
10.077*** 
PEST Pesticides used  
(100ml) 
66.64 
(69.05) 
6.49 
(18.03) 
24.79 
(49.31) 
10.491*** 
HERB Herbicides used 
 (100ml) 
1.69 
(3.86) 
0.10 
(0.23) 
1.18 
(3.31) 
-3.750*** 
LABOR Total labour worked  
(man-days) 
127.45 
(75.82) 
132.62 
(97.81) 
131.05 
(91.55) 
2.449*** 
LANDSZ Total land operated 
 (ha)  
1.73 
(1.35) 
1.83 
(1.18) 
1.80 
(1.23) 
-9.266*** 
OUTPVAL Value of total farm 
output (100 Birr) 
66.27 
(82.03) 
60.83 
(83.62) 
62.49 
(83.01) 
7.319*** 
WEALTH Household wealth 
 (1000 Birr) 
26.23 
(17.23) 
9.56 
(6.93) 
14.63 
(13.48) 
6.705*** 
LANDFRA
G 
Land fragmentation 
 (No. of plots) 
2.65 
(1.58) 
3.13 
(1.70) 
2.98 
(1.67) 
-2.003** 
CREDSZ Size of credit obtained  
(Birr) 
323.71 
(596.22) 
299.71 
(573.88) 
307.01 
(579.62) 
-1.529 
CREDINFO  % of households with 
credit information 90 84 86 
1.344 
CREDAPPL % of households 
applied for credit 71 65 67 
-2.916*** 
CREDAPPR % of households who 
obtained credit 60 53 55 
-4.527*** 
EXACSS % of households with 
extension visit 29 44 40 
-8.432*** 
 
§
Standard deviation of the means in brackets; sample means for dummy variables 
indicate fractions taking value 1 in the sub-sample. *** and ** indicate 1% and 5% 
significance levels, respectively, for test of mean difference between the two 
groups. Credit-constrained and unconstrained groups have sample sizes of 167 and 
73, respectively.  
 
Source: Own survey, 2004/05 
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6.  Results and discussion 
6.1 Estimated technical efficiencies  
Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the stochastic frontier 
production function specified in equation (4) are obtained using LIMDEP 7.0 
software (Greene, 1995). The estimated values for the variance parameters,  , in 
the stochastic frontier production model are significant, which indicate that  
technical inefficiency affects outputs of the two groups of farm households. The 
estimates for CCFH and CUFH are presented in Table III. In the case of CUFH, all 
input variables but HERB and LAND were statistically significant, and all but 
LAND and SEED showed the expected positive signs. LABOR had the highest input 
elasticity of production but HERB had the lowest, although the effect of HERB was 
not statistically significant. This implies that more farm revenue can be obtained by 
using more labour on the farm, as the production system in the study area is labour 
intensive.  For CCFH, all variables except HERB were statistically significant and 
all but LAND and SEED had the expected positive signs. Capital-intensive inputs 
such as FERT, PEST and HERB had higher output elasticities for this group of farm 
households. The CCFH group used lower levels of capital-intensive inputs because 
of financial constraint, which is intuitive. Higher marginal effects of the limited 
capital inputs suggest that the CUFH could choose variable inputs more 
proportionally and this allowed them to have higher mean productive efficiency 
than the CCFH. 
 
Table III: MLE estimates of stochastic production frontier  
 
Variable 
Credit-constrained Credit-unconstrained 
Coefficienta Coefficienta 
Intercept 6.95 (12.51)*** 5.61 (11.78)*** 
LnLAND -0.34  (-1.66)* -0.11 (-0.86) 
LnFERT 0.13  (2.02)** 0.13  (4.47)*** 
LnSEED -0.27  (-1.87)* -0.19  (-2.77)** 
LnHERB 0.04  (0.72) 0.02  (0.70) 
LnPEST 0.07  (1.70)* 0.05  (2.24)** 
LnLABOR 0.58  (4.15)*** 0.69  (9.13)*** 
  0.76  (12.82)*** 0.67  (11.16)*** 
  1.48  (11.43)*** 0.90  (10.98)*** 
Log Likelihood -351.15 -259.16      
 
a 
Values in brackets are t-ratios; ***, ** and * indicate 1% , 5% and 10% 
significance levels, respectively. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm 
(ln) of the value of total farm output per hectare (in Birr). Sample size for credit-
constrained and unconstrained groups is 167 and 73, respectively. 
 
Policymakers are often interested in ranking firms in terms of their efficiencies to 
devise appropriate intervention policies (Dorfman and Koop, 2005). For this 
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reason, frequency distributions of the farm household-specific productive 
efficiencies for both the CCFH and the CUFH groups are reported in Table IV and 
more vividly displayed in Figure I. It can be observed that productive efficiency 
varies widely among sample farm households in both groups. The mean technical 
efficiency score was 67% for CUFH and 55% for the CCFH group, suggesting a 
significant deterrent effect of access to credit on the efficiency of the farm 
households. The two groups, which mainly differ in their credit constraint status, 
had a 12% difference in average technical efficiency. Compared to other studies, 
this 12% is higher than, for example, the 8.34% profit loss difference between 
expenditure-constrained and unconstrained farmers Blancard et al., (2006) 
observed in France and the 8% Färe et al. (1990) observed in US. Since the 
proportion of CCFH in our sample is larger than the CUFH, improving credit 
access can significantly raise output. The average efficiency scores of 55% for 
CCFH and 67% for CUFH indicate not only the presence of significant efficiency 
gap between the two groups of farm households but also the presence of high level 
of technical inefficiency in both groups. The CUFH, on average, had potential loss 
of 33% in farm revenue due to technical inefficiency whereas the CCFH had about 
45%, which suggests that both the gap in inefficiency between the two groups and 
the specific inefficiency of each group need to be reduced in order to produce at 
maximum possible technical efficiency levels. 
 
Table IV: Frequency distribution of efficiency estimates  
 
Efficiency 
Score (%)§ 
 
Credit-constrained Credit-unconstrained 
No. of farm 
households 
Percent No. of farm 
households 
Percent 
0<28 8 5 0 0 
28-33 18 11 1 1 
34-38 17 10 3 4 
39-43 21 13 2 3 
44-48 15 9 5 7 
49-53 16 10 9 12 
54-58 13 8 7 10 
59-63 20 12 10 14 
64-68 16 10 11 15 
69-73 14 8 9 12 
74-78 8 5 10 14 
79<100 0 0 6 8 
Mean  55  67  
Min  20  28  
Max  75  85  
SD  13  11  
 
§
The mean, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of the efficiency scores are 
in percentages. Sample size for credit constrained and unconstrained are 167 and 73 
respectively. 
 
Not only the technical efficiencies were different between the two groups of farm 
households, but also there were differences in the distribution of the estimated 
technical efficiencies of the two groups of farm households. The minimum technical 
efficiency score for the CUFH was 28% but that of the CCFH was 20%.  The 
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maximum technical efficiency score for CUFH was 85% whereas for the CCFH 
was 75%. Moreover, about 65% of the CCFH had 58% and less technical 
efficiency scores but only about 30% of the CUFH had such levels of technical 
efficiencies, indicating more loss in potential farm revenue of the CCFH than the 
CUFH. Figure I depicts the cumulative distribution of the efficiency scores for the 
two groups. The technical efficiency scores of the CUFH group were skewed 
towards the highest efficiency scores whereas those of CCFH were skewed towards 
the lower scores. That is, the majority of the CCFH had lower technical 
efficiencies, resulting in large aggregate loss in output. Since knowing efficiency 
scores is not an end by itself, additional factors contributing to the differences in the 
technical efficiencies of the farm households are discussed below. 
 
  
Figure I: Cumulative frequency of farm households by technical efficiency score  
 
 
6.2 Factors affecting inefficiency    
The parameter estimates of the relationship between technical inefficiency and farm 
households’ demographic, socioeconomic and institutional factors are shown in 
Table V. High R
2 
values show presence of a strong explanatory power of the 
covariates and thus a strong goodness-of-fit of the model to the data. The F-test for 
joint hypothesis that all non-intercept coefficients in the model were zero was also 
rejected, indicating that the observed inefficiency differential between the CCFH 
and CUFH groups was not due to mere chance but explained by the included 
covariates. The fourth column of Table V shows estimates for the full sample, 
where a dummy variable, indicating whether a farm household had obtained a credit 
or not, was included for comparison. This is similar to the way most previous 
studies in Ethiopia and elsewhere used dummy variables. However, this dummy 
variable shows whether farm household took a loan or not but does not identify 
whether the farm households were still credit constrained after taking the credit or 
not. The estimated coefficient of this dummy variable turned out to be statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that credit had no effect on technical efficiency of the farm 
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households. For example, the study by Haji & Andersson (2006) had concluded in 
this way. However, such conclusion may be incorrect since taking a loan may not 
necessarily mean that the borrower had his/her credit constraint resolved. Since this 
variable does not show the credit-constraint of a borrower, one needs to go further 
and identify whether or not the farm household is still credit constrained after 
taking the loan.  
 
The estimates in the second and third columns of Table V explicitly considered 
the credit-constraint status of the farm households, and the following discussions 
are based on these columns. It should be noted that technical inefficiency scores 
were used in the estimated regression model, and therefore when we interpret the 
coefficients a negative effect of the estimate on technical inefficiency equally 
means a positive effect on efficiency. 
  
Table V: Parameter estimates of inefficiency effects model 
 
Variable 
 
Credit-constrained Credit-unconstrained Full sample 
Coefficient (t-ratio) Coefficient (t-ratio) Coefficient (t-ratio) 
Constant 0.53 (1.82)** 0.73 (1.88)** 0.59 (3.55)*** 
AGEH 0.09 (2.25)** 0.05 (0.63) 0.06 (3.06)** 
HHSZ -0.05 (-0.61) -0.07  (-2.33)** -0.04 (-2.12)** 
EDUC -0.06 (-2.04)** -0.03 (-2.04)** -0.05 (-2.56)** 
LANDFRAG 0.09 (3.11)*** 0.07 (3.50)*** 0.08 (3.17)*** 
EXACSS -0.08 (-0.73) -0.12 (-0.55) -0.12 (-0.68) 
CREDSZ -0.10 (-2.11)** -0.05 (-2.11)** -0.07 (-2.32)** 
WEALTH -0.03 (-3.00)*** 0.02 (0.44) -0.03 (-2.71)** 
CREDINFO -0.07 (-0.44) -0.04 (-0.27) -0.05 (-0.93) 
INTEREST 0.06 (1.20) 0.03 (0.90) 0.07 (0.67) 
DISCREDF 0.07 (0.70) 0.05 (0.53) 0.05 (1.30) 
CREDAPPR§   -0.24 (-1.56) 
No. of observation 167 73 
 
240 
R2 0.89 0.86 0.83 
 
Notes:  *** and ** indicate 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively. The 
dependent variable is inefficiency score (IEi) as defined in the 
methodology part. 
§
This is a dummy variable taking value of 1 if the household obtained 
credit and 0 otherwise, included in the model using the full sample. 
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The age of the farm household head positively affected technical inefficiency of 
the CCFH, which is contrary to the hypothesis. For CUFH, age had not significant 
effect. A positive age effect for the CCFH means that older farmers were less 
efficient than younger ones. A possible explanation could be that the older farmers, 
although more experienced, might be more conservative and less receptive to 
modern technologies and farm practices that enhance technical efficiency than their 
younger peers. In Eastern Hararghe zone of Ethiopia, Seyoum et al. (1998) also 
observed a similar result in their study that compared technical efficiencies of 
farmers within and outside SG-2000 project, which was a pilot extension project 
later widely adopted in most agricultural regions of the country. 
 
Household size significantly and negatively affected technical inefficiency of the 
CUFH group whereas it was insignificant for the CCFH group. This means that 
inefficiency decreases with household size of the CUFH. The CUFH could choose 
optimal levels of labour because they were not financially constrained. The 
insignificance of household size for the CCFH implies that labour supply did not 
matter for their efficiency, since because of credit constraint they could not 
proportionally choose optimal levels of other inputs. As expected, education level 
of the heads of farm households significantly and positively affected technical 
efficiency of both groups of farm households but with higher effect for the CCFH 
group. It means that technical efficiency of a farm household head increases with 
his/her formal schooling. Education, as a human capital, has multiple effects on the 
performance of the farm households, including acquisition, processing and 
utilization of information and farm managerial skills, which in turn can increase 
their technical efficiency. It suggests that public policy facilitating investment in 
farmers’ education can increase farmers’ technical efficiency. This result supports 
the effort Ethiopia has been putting on establishing farmers’ technical training 
centres at the level of Farmers’ Associations, the lowest rural administrative units. 
 
Land fragmentation significantly and negatively affected technical efficiency of 
both groups of farm households, as expected. It means that fragmentation of a given 
fixed size of total farmland has inverse relationship with technical efficiency of the 
farm households. This may be explained in two ways. First, land fragmentation can 
deter optimal use indivisible technologies, such as irrigation equipment. Second, 
considerable amount of time and effort can be wasted in coordinating farm 
operations at different plots, especially as the distance between the plots increases. 
The result suggests that technical efficiency of the farmers can be improved by 
aligning farm plots allocated to a household. This has important relevance for land 
distribution policy in Ethiopia, where land is allocated to the farm households by 
the government. In a country where land markets function well, farmers may be 
advised to consider buying adjacent farm plots to reduce the negative effect of land 
fragmentation on their technical efficiency. 
 
The amount of loan obtained significantly and positively affected technical 
efficiency of both groups of farm households, with the effect being more 
pronounced in the case of the CCFH group. The positive effect of the loan size can 
be seen in two ways. First, as the loan size increases, the unit cost of borrowing, 
including transaction costs, decreases because some of these costs are fixed 
regardless of the amount of loans and with increased loan size, the total cost thinly 
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spreads over large loan size and reduces average unit cost. Second, as the amount 
of loan increases, farm households may be less constrained to acquire improved 
technologies and choose optimal levels of inputs, making them less inefficient than 
others. The result suggests that for the loan to bring about significant impact on the 
technical efficiency of a farm household, the loan size should be adequate to meet 
effective demand. A larger loan size will also have a cost reduction implication for 
lenders in that unit cost of credit delivery will fall with increased loan size per 
borrower, which can also make the lender more profitable. This in turn can create 
an incentive for the lender to reduce the lending interest rate with increased loan 
volume. 
 
The wealth variable significantly and positively affected technical efficiency of 
the CCFH group but insignificant for the CUFH. This means that technical 
efficiency increases with the wealth of the CCFH. Intuitively, as wealth increases, 
credit constraint tends to ease from both the demand and supply sides. That is, 
farmers’ capacity to self-finance internally may increase as they get wealthier, 
reducing demand for credit. However, if wealthier farm households expand their 
farm operations and demand additional external resources, they will be more 
creditworthy and less rationed in the credit market than their less wealthy peers. For 
the CUFH, the insignificant effect of wealth implies that their technical efficiency 
was independent of their wealth. That is the CUFH can still attain desired 
efficiency levels since they are not credit-constrained to choose optimal levels of 
inputs. The significant effect of wealth on the technical efficiency of CCFH means 
that within the CCFH, relatively wealthier farm households are more efficient than 
less wealthy ones. This implies that technical efficiency of a credit constrained 
household depends on its wealth level. 
 
The effects of the variables extension visit, credit information, interest rate and 
distance to a lender turned out to be statistically insignificant, which suggests that 
these variables did not matter for both groups’ technical efficiency. Some possible 
reasons for their insignificance are the following. Extension visit and credit 
information might be insignificant probably because farmers had only a few visits 
to extension offices and had limited credit information that maybe did not add much 
to his/her existing information base.  It may also be that farmers’ technical 
efficiency may not improve by mere increase in farmers’ extension visit and credit 
information. In this connection, for example Alene & Hassan (2006) argue that 
poor communication skills of extension agents and low extension-agent-to-farmer 
ratio would pose a limit to the number of beneficiary farmers in extension service. 
Similarly, lack of organized credit market information and farmers’ lack of it can 
also contribute to the insignificant effect of the variable. This in turn implies that 
better qualities, rather than mere presence, of these services can have better effect. 
The variable distance to lenders was perhaps insignificant because there was no 
considerable variation among farmers to equally inaccessible lenders. It may also 
suggest that distance may not matter if other components of the transaction costs 
(such as paper works, speed of loan processing and disbursement) can be 
significantly reduced. Similarly, some barriers other than the interest rates might be 
more important to improve the credit constraint condition of the farm households 
and reduce its efficiency effect.   
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7. Conclusions and policy implications 
In this paper we estimated technical efficiencies of credit-constrained (CCFH) and 
unconstrained farm households (CUFH) using parametric stochastic frontier 
technique. We found that the mean technical efficiency scores for CCFH and 
CUFH were estimated at 55% and 67%, respectively, which means that the two 
groups of farm households, on average, had technical efficiency difference of 12 
percent. Although the credit constraint was the focus of this study, additional 
factors were also controlled for. It was found that the technical efficiencies of both 
groups of farm households were significantly affected by farmers’ education, land 
fragmentation and loan size. Besides, the efficiency of the CCFH was influenced by 
their farm experience and wealth, and that of the CUFH was affected by household 
size, as related to family labour supply. The results suggest that credit availability 
and loan size, farmers’ education and landholding structure need to be improved for 
all farmers. Moreover, especially for CCFH, farm experience (as related to farm 
management skills) and household wealth (e.g., through better facilities and 
incentives to increase saving and capital accumulation) require improvement. The 
study enriches the existing empirical literature dealing with credit constraints by 
explicitly treating credit constraint of the farm households, which often enter in 
earlier studies merely as a dummy variable. The direct elicitation method used 
allowed explicit comparison of farm households based on their credit constraint 
status. In general, the study demonstrated that farmers are not homogenous in their 
demand for credit and subsequently in their credit constraints, and this has 
important effect on their technical efficiency. The study also suggests that in 
efficiency analyses, more could be learned by explicitly considering credit 
constraint of farm households. 
 
An important policy concern in developing countries in general and particularly 
in Ethiopia is raising agricultural production, given limited resources, to meet the 
ever-increasing demand for food due to increasing human population. However, 
attaining maximum possible output using a given level of inputs, in which relative 
variation among farm households in resource endowments and access to credit 
results in efficiency differential, requires careful studies. Agricultural credit policies 
generally aim at alleviating credit constraints of farmers in order for farmers to be 
able to increase their output production by producing at maximum possible 
technical efficiency. In light of this, the results of this study suggest that for a loan 
to result in higher technical efficiency, it needs to satisfy the effective credit 
demand of the farmers adequately. Given the largest proportion of the CCFH in the 
Ethiopian farming population, the 12% gap between technical efficiencies of CCFH 
and CUFH suggests that there are considerable potential losses in output due to 
inefficiency. This calls for a policy measure that would address credit constraint 
problem of both groups of farm households in general, and those of the credit-
constrained group, in particular. 
 
On the one hand, a “blanket supply” of credit to all farm households without 
considering their difference in effective credit demand and constraint status would 
not guarantee that such a credit supply would result in alleviation of farmers’ credit 
constraints. On the other hand, and more importantly, the credit-constrained group 
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would be less efficient than the unconstrained ones, resulting in low level of 
outputs. This, in turn, will adversely affect the capacity of farmers to repay the debt. 
At the aggregate, this will also affect the effectiveness of credit supply. 
 
The fact that the CUFH are more technically efficient than the CCFH suggests 
that a credit supply that is responsive to effective credit demand of farm households 
would result in higher outputs, which would also increase creditworthiness of the 
farmers. An increase in farmers’ creditworthiness can raise lenders’ incentive to 
extend more loans to the extent that can meet effective credit demand of the 
farmers. In other words, adequate credit reduces credit constraint and increases 
technical efficiency, farm outputs and creditworthiness of borrowers. On the 
contrary, it would be economically unattractive for farmers to receive a loan that 
cannot meet their effective credit demand, as they will remain credit-constrained 
and cannot increase their efficiency. This suggests that lenders should identify 
farmers’ effective credit demand before determining loan sizes since farmers are 
not homogeneous in their demand for credit. In developing countries, government 
intervention in a credit system, as spurred by credit market failure, often becomes 
ineffective because it is delivered based on the implicit assumption that the farmers 
have similar demands for credit, thereby ending up in one-fits-all credit supply. 
This often does not match with effective credit demand of some farmers. This is 
evident from the fact that a considerable proportion of respondents who received 
credit also reported being credit-constrained. More often, significant credit defaults 
are reported in the formal credit sectors of developing countries. One possible 
cause could be that farmers cannot attain the necessary technical efficiency 
allowing debt repayment if the loans cannot meet their effective credit demand. 
However, ability to repay a credit, as related to higher output, could only be a 
necessary, not a sufficient, condition for debt repayment.  
 
Another important implication of the results for credit policy is related to the cost 
of credit supply. The insignificant effect of interest rates on the efficiency of 
farmers suggests that factors other than the direct cost of borrowing may be 
important to consider. For example, some farmers may find monetary and non-
monetary transaction costs (such as paper works, loan processing speed and speed 
of loan disbursement) higher than the interest rates. In this case, lenders need to 
consider the effect of such costs on the farmers’ demand for credit and devise 
strategy to reduce such costs, by using information technology, for example, which 
can lower costs of credit transaction, monitoring and evaluation. In the absence of 
IT facility, lenders need to consider the proximity of branches of financial 
institution to borrowers. 
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